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Abstract 
This paper offers a brief summary of non-traditional monetary policy measures adopted 
by  the  Bank  of  Japan  (BOJ)  during  the  last  two  decades,  especially  the  period 
1998-2006,  when  the  so-called  Zero  Interest  Rate  Policy  (ZIRP)  and  Quantitative 
Easing (QE) were put in place. The paper begins with a typology of policies usable at 
low  interest  and  inflation  rates.  They  are:  strategy  (i),  management  of  expectations 
about future policy rates; strategy (ii), targeted asset purchases; and strategy (iii), QE. 
Alternatively, QE may be decomposed into a pure attempt to inflate the central bank 
balance sheet, QE0, purchases of assets in dysfunctional markets, QE1, and purchases 
of assets to generate portfolio rebalancing, QE2. Strategy (ii), when non-sterilized, is 
either QE1 or QE2. Using this typology, I review the measures adopted by the BOJ and 
discuss evidence on the effectiveness of the measures. The broad conclusion is that 
strategies (i) and (ii) have affected interest rates, while no clear evidence exists so far of 
the  effectiveness  of  the  pure  form  of  strategy  (iii),  or  QE0.  Strategy  (ii)  has  been 
effective  especially  in  containing  risk/liquidity  premiums  in  dysfunctional  money 
markets; that is, QE1 has been effective. The effectiveness of QE2, however, is less 
clear-cut. The strategies, however, have failed to bring the Japanese economy out of the 
deflation trap so far. I discuss some possible reasons for this and also implications for 
the current U.S. situation.   
   2 
     The rate of change in the ex energy-food component of Japan’ Consumer Price 
Index (henceforth, CPI) fell below zero in early 1999 and has been negative since then 
with  only  minor  exceptions.  The  BOJ  has  deployed  many  so-called  non-traditional 
monetary  policy  measures  in  an  attempt  to  stop  the  deflation  of  CPI.  The  attempt, 
however, has so far not succeeded. This episode is interesting in itself, but also in light 
of the current disinflationary tendencies of the developed economies and central banks’ 
attempts, especially by the Fed, to stop them. Many of the measures central banks are 
currently using are those that were used by the BOJ earlier. Thus, the experience of the 
BOJ seems to warrant a careful review. 
     Japan’s failure to stop deflation within a short period of time must have come 
from  one  of  the  following  three  possibilities:  (a)  non-traditional  monetary  policy 
measures have not been as effective as some had thought; (b) the BOJ has used them in 
suboptimal  ways;  and  (c)  negative  shocks  hitting  the  Japanese  economy  have  been 
unusually serious. I will argue in this short note that all three were playing some roles. 
    In section 1 I begin with a typology of policies usable at low interest and inflation 
rates. In section 2 I explain the measures adopted by the BOJ, using this typology. 
Section 3 is devoted to the discussion of evidence on the effectiveness of the measures. 
In section 4 I discuss some possible reasons for the findings and also implications for 
the current U.S. situation.   
 
1, Typology of Policy Options near the ZLB 
 
Bernanke & Reinhart (2004) offer a convenient classification of policies near the 
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (ZLB). That is, policy measures can be 
classified as: (i) shaping interest rate expectations or forward guidance according to 
Clarida (2010)—providing assurance to the market that policy rates will be lower in the 
future  than  currently  expected;  (ii)  changing  the  composition  of  the  central  bank’s 
balance sheet in a way the central bank’s holdings of non-traditional assets increase 
(targeted asset purchases); and (iii) expanding the size of the central bank’s balance 
sheet beyond the level required for a zero policy rate (Quantitative Easing: QE) This is 
summarized in Table 1.   
In order to clearly differentiate between (ii) and (iii), it would be useful to think of 
(iii) as an attempt to expand the balance sheet by purchases of traditional assets, say, 
treasury bills. Then, an expansion of a central bank balance sheet based on purchases of 
non-traditional assets is a combination of (ii) and (iii). Strong forms of quantitative 
easing  are  accompanied  by  a  target  on  a  measure  of  central  bank  balance  sheet  or   3 
quantity of money. 
Many central banks, in their recent pursuit of strategy (ii) since 2007, have left 
the funds supplied unsterilized, thus giving the appearance that they have been pursuing 
QE. This gives rise to an alternative typology with respect to strategies (ii) and (iii). 
Strategy (iii) may be regarded as plain-vanilla QE--QE0, while unsterilized version of 
strategy (ii) has consisted of two types: one, purchases of assets in distressed markets, 
QE1, and, the other, asset purchases in more normal markets, QE2.
1  Another name for 
QE1 has been credit easing and is aimed at containment of liquidity/risk premiums in 
markets under stress. Asset purchases under QE2 have had the i ntention of generating 
portfolio rebalancing effects.
2  This typology is also summarized in Table 1. 
All these options were already suggested and discussed in the November 1999 
Boston  Fed  conference.  Since  then  s ignificant  amounts  of  works  have  appeared 
regarding the theoretical foundations of, and empirical estimates of the effectiveness of 
these approaches. No attempt is made here to provide a survey of the literature. (See, for 
example, Ueda (2012) and Curdia & Woodford (2010).) Instead, we will focus on  the 
Japanese experience in the remainder of the paper. 
 
2, The Bank of Japan’s Monetary Policy during 1992-2006 
 
Chronology 
Since the early 1990s the Japanese economy has experienced serious negative 
interactions among declining asset prices, increasingly dysfunctional financial system 
and deteriorating real economy. The inflation of CPI also fell below 1% by 1994. In 
response to such developments the BOJ reduced the overnight interest rate to below 
0.5% already in the summer of 1995, from the high of 8.6% in 1991. The economy did 
not recover fully despite the 800 basis point cut in the overnight rate and went into a 
severe credit crunch in 1997-1998. The overnight rate was lowered to virtually zero by 
early 1999. The inflation rate moved into negative territory in the second half of 1998 
and has been there since then. Thus, the economy has been effectively in a "liquidity 
trap" for 15 years.   
The BOJ continued its exploration for further easing measures in 1999 and the 
                                                   
1  The market currently seems to be using the term QE2 to mean a second round attempt at 
quantitative easing, which is different from, although not quite inconsistent with, the usage of the 
term here. 
2  Some of the credit easing measures that have been employed involved no purchases of assets. For 
example, the central bank can lend to financial institutions against distressed assets in which case 
this may appear just like a normal operation as far as the central bank balance sheet is concerned.   4 
2000s. The so-called zero interest rate policy (ZIRP)—the core of the BOJ’s monetary 
policy  since  1999--was  introduced  in  April  1999.  The  ZIRP  was  not  just  a  zero 
short-term interest rate, but a commitment to maintain it “until deflationary concerns 
were dispelled”.
3   
In August 2000, the BOJ lifted the ZIRP and raised the overnight call rate to 
0.25 % based on the judgment that the economy was recovering and showing some 
signs  of  overcoming  deflation.  The  world  economy,  however,  fell  into  a  serious 
recession as the IT bubble collapsed in 2001, and the BOJ adopted the quantitative 
easing policy--let us call it QEJ, Japan's version of QE--in March 2001. QEJ consisted 
of three pillars. First, the BOJ maintained an ample liquidity supply by using the current 
account balances (CABs) at the BOJ, essentially bank reserves, as the operating policy 
target. Second, the BOJ committed itself to maintaining the provision of ample liquidity 
until the rate of change of the CPI became zero percent or higher on a sustained basis.   
Third,  the  BOJ  increased  the  amount  of  purchases  of  Japanese  Government  Bonds 
(JGBs)  from  time  to  time  as  a  tool  for  liquidity  injection.  It  was  projected  that 
increasing the CAB target beyond the level of the required reserves would normally 
keep the call rate near zero percent. Thus, with the commitment to maintain ample 
liquidity provision until deflation ended, QEJ contained a version of the ZIRP.    Viewed 
in this way, QEJ can be regarded as consisting of ZIRP and liquidity provision beyond 
levels  necessary  for  a  zero  rate  that  relied  partially  on  purchases  of  long-term 
government bonds.   
The target on the CABs was increased from approximately 5 trillion yen at the 
introduction of QEJ in March 2001, an amount roughly 1 trillion yen greater than the 
then-required reserves, to a range of approximately 30-35 trillion yen in January 2004. 
The increases in the CABs were achieved mainly by market operations, including the 
BOJ’s purchases of JGBs. The amount of JGB purchases was 0.4 trillion yen per month 
in March 2001 and was gradually increased to 1.2 trillion yen by May 2004. QEJ was 
finally lifted in  March  2006. The extent of the BOJ’s balance sheet  expansion was 
unprecedented at that time and is comparable to that of other central banks during the 
late 2000s as shown in Figure 1.
4 
 
                                                   
3  Some use the ZIRP to mean only a zero policy rate. Here it refers to the combination of a zero rate 
and the commitment to maintain it until deflation ends. 
4  The worldwide financial and economic turmoil that began in 2007 and the ensuing resurgence of 
deflationary forces in the economy have forced the BOJ to adopt various non-traditional monetary 
policy measures again. In October 2010 the BOJ announced a new comprehensive monetary policy 
package which included purchases of risky assets such as ETFs, REITs and corporate bonds as well 
as increased purchases of JGBs.   5 
Use of the three strategies 
In terms of the classification of unconventional monetary policy measures into 
strategies (i)-(iii), there was first the explicit use of strategy (i) under the ZIRP and QEJ. 
QEJ also contained strategy (iii). 
In  addition,  the  BOJ  relied  on  strategy  (ii)  extensively  to  contain  the  rise  in 
liquidity and risk premiums in the financial system. For example, since the credit crunch 
of  1998,  the  BOJ  expanded  its  fund-supplying  operations  using  commercial  papers 
(CPs) as collateral. This move is believed to have added to the liquidity of the CP 
market and, in turn, led to declines in issuing costs of CPs. In addition, the BOJ had 
started to accept Asset Backed Securities (ABSs) as collateral for its fund supplying 
operation since October 1999. In the spring of 2003 the BOJ went further by its decision 
to purchase Asset Backed CPs (ABCPs) and ABSs outright. Separately, the BOJ had 
established a standby scheme that allowed banks to sell equities they held to the BOJ 
since December 2002. Banks could certainly sell stocks in the market. Given the then 
low liquidity of the market, however, banks may have been reluctant to sell stocks and 
lower prices themselves.   
Even operations under strategy (iii) had an element of strategy (ii). In its pursuit of 
QEJ, the BOJ increasingly had to lend long in the money market. This was because 
finding borrowers paying positive interest rate became difficult at short maturities. As of 
April 2001, the start of the QEJ period, fund supplying operations had maturities of one 
to three months. In March 2005, some operations were of 11 month maturity. In addition, 
to the extent that the BOJ’s purchases of JGBs are regarded as targeted asset purchases, 
there was an extensive use of strategy (ii) during the QEJ period. 
In terms of QE0-QE2, QEJ can be seen to have contained all of them. Setting the 
target on the current account balances formally meant that it was the amount of bank 
reserves that was important rather than the assets bought to achieve the target, that is, 
QE0 was pursued. As discussed above, however, there were also credit easing (QE1) 
type measures and purchases of JGBs were a core component of QEJ as well, which 
was QE2. All this is summarized in Table 2. 
 
3, Evidence on the Effectiveness of the BOJ’s Monetary Policy 
 
The literature on the effectiveness of the BOJ’s non-traditional monetary policy 
carried out during 1998-2006 seems to have found the following.
5  There is evidence 
                                                   
5  See Ugai (2007) for a useful summary of the literature. Ueda (2012) also carries out a detailed 
analysis of the effects of non-conventional monetary policy measures adopted by the BOJ.   6 
that strategy (i) lowered a wide range of interest rates. The effects of QEJ are more 
complicated. It did lower interest rates, especially in the money market, but, apart from 
a small decline in the overnight rate, which was due to QE0, the declines in money 
market rates seem to have been a result of various QE1 type operations the BOJ carried 
out. There is some evidence that QE2 aspect of QEJ lowered long-term interest rates, 
while QE0, that is, a mere increase in the size of the BOJ balance sheet did not. Some of 
the measures boosted stock prices as well. Evidence on the effects on the exchange rate 
is hard to find. Despite the evidence of significant effects of some of the measures on 
interest  rates,  the  measures  obviously  were  not  enough  to  stop  the  declines  in  the 
general price level. 
Concerning strategy (i), Figure 2 shows the Euro Yen rate yield curve before and 
after the introduction of strategy (i) on April 13, 1999. The curve shifted down between 
March 2 and April 8 in response to the BOJ’s attempt to lower the overnight rate down 
to zero. It shifted down further, however, after the announcement on April 13 to keep a 
zero rate until deflationary concerns dispelled. The declines can be seen to be larger for 
longer term rates for which expectations of future rates play larger roles. More formally, 
both  Okina  &  Shiratsuka  (2004)  and  Oda  &  Ueda  (2007)  show  that  the  BOJ’s 
commitment to maintain a zero rate until deflation ended produced strong effects on 
expected future short rates, thus on current medium- to long-term interest rates. 
The effects of QEJ are more complicated. Figure 3 plots the movements in the 10 
year swap rate and Nikkei 225 after March 2001.  It can be seen that the swap rate 
declined and the stock market index went up sharply in response to the announcement 
of QEJ on March 19. This, of course, is a typical response of asset prices to a monetary 
easing. The stock market, with short-run ups and downs, continued to go up until early 
May. The cumulative increase in the index was close to 20%. The 10 year interest rate 
turned upward after the initial decrease and rose about 35 basis points until mid-April.   
The combined response of the long-term interest rate and the stock market is also one 
possible outcome of a policy like QEJ especially if it raises growth and/or inflation 
expectations. Thus, QEJ did generate a successful response in the asset markets for a 
while. The figure shows, however, that the favorable response of the asset markets came 
to an end by mid-May and that both the interest rate and the stock price index came 
back to roughly where they were at the time of the introduction of QEJ by the end of 
June. The markets were disappointed by the absence of a pickup in economic activities. 
Thus, some asset prices did respond to QEJ favorably for a while, but not the economy. 
Which aspect of QEJ generated the short-run response of the asset prices requires a 
more careful analysis.   7 
As expected, money market rates did respond to QEJ on a sustained basis. For 
example, the weighted average of the overnight call market rate declined to a low of two 
basis points during the ZIRP period, but to literally 0% during the QEJ period, which 
probably was due to the QE0 aspect of QEJ. As a result, some banks paid negative 
overnight rates on certain days. More importantly, Figure 4 shows the spread between 
three month interbank rate and the three month Treasury bill rate. The risk premium 
declined during the ZIRP and QEJ periods, but slightly more in the QEJ period.   
Baba et al. (2006) is an example of a more formal analysis trying to disentangle 
among the effects of various components of QEJ on money market rates. Using a panel 
data on bank negotiable certificate of deposit rates, it shows that, after controlling for 
the effects of changes in bank creditworthiness, the dummies for the ZIRP and QEJ 
periods exerted significant negative effects on the rates, while the QE0 aspect of QEJ, 
that is, the amount of the current account balances at the BOJ did not lower the rates. 
The  significance  of  the  ZIRP  and  QEJ  dummies  may  be  thought  to  indicate  the 
effectiveness of the strategy (i) aspect of the two frameworks. The paper also shows that, 
for the QEJ period, the average maturity of the BOJ’s fund supplying operations exerted 
significant effect on the rates. During the QEJ period, the BOJ had found it increasingly 
difficult, and thus resorted to longer and longer fund supplying operations, to hit the 
target on the current account balances. To the extent that the money market was still 
dysfunctional, these operations may be regarded as of the QE1 type, while to the extent 
that it was back to normal, they were of type QE2. The paper and other studies also 
point to the effectiveness of QE1 type operations such as CP purchases for containing 
risk premiums.
6 
Studies on the effects of the BOJ’s purchases of JGBs, a QE2 type measure, on 
their yields have found mixed results. Oda & Ueda (2007) fail to find any significant 
effects of the BOJ’s purchases of JGBs on either the expected future short rates or risk 
premiums on JGBs. The failure may be due to the technical difficulty of separating the 
effects  of  JGB  purchases  from  those  of  the  commitment  to  maintain  a  zero  rate. 
Alternatively, it could be a result of the fairly short remaining maturity of the JGBs 
purchased by the BOJ.
7 
8  On the other hand, Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004), who 
carry out a macro finance  analysis of the ZIRP and QEJ , find statistically significant 
links between the BOJ’s purchases of JGBs and JGB yields.   
                                                   
6  See, for example, the BOJ (2009). 
7  The remaining maturity of JGBs bought by the BOJ declined to less than 4 years in 2005. See 
McCauley and Ueda (2009). 
8  Several recent studies of the effect of the Fed’s purchases of government bonds have found 
significant effects on interest rates. See, for example, Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack (2010) .   8 
Ueda (2012) carries out a detailed analysis of almost all policy measures adopted 
by the BOJ on asset prices, including stock prices, short- to long-term interest rates and 
exchange rates. It finds that most of the easing measures led to declines in interest rates 
and  a  rise  in  the  stock  market.  However,  the  effects  of  QE0  type  moves,  that  is, 
increases in the target for the current account balances without accompanying increases 
in  the  amount  of JGB  purchases  or  other  targeted  asset  purchases,  are  found  to  be 
statistically insignificant. This result points to the effectiveness of QE1 and/or QE2. The 
study, however, does not find significant effects of the measures on the exchange rate. 
There were at least two more significant monetary policy measures adopted that 
seem to fall under the heading of strategy (ii), the BOJ's purchases of equities from 
banks (2002-2004) and purchases of ABS (2003-2005).
9  The purchases of ABS were 
not very successful mainly because the market for ABS was still very small. Against the 
ceiling of 1 trillion yen, the outstanding amount of the ABS held by the BOJ in 2005 
was only 0.12 trillion. "Credit easing" seems to be effective only when there is a large 
market which experiences a major disruption, say, a significant decline in market 
liquidity. On the other hand, the BOJ ended up buying roughly the targeted amount, 2 
trillion yen in its equity buying scheme. This  operation may be seen as an attempt to 
address a temporary decline in the stock market liquidity and the erosion of bank capital 
as stock prices plummeted. A more rigorous evaluation of this scheme, however, is a 
topic for future study.
10 
To summarize, there is evidence that strategy (i) and some of strategy (ii) affected 
asset  prices,  especially,  interest  rates  and  stock  prices,  but  the  evidence  for  the 




Some difficulties with Strategy (i) 
     The above discussion points to the effectiveness of strategy (i) for generating 
easing effects. Some of the problems of the strategy, however, need to be noted. First, it 
is  well  known  that  the  strategy  suffers  from  dynamic  inconsistency  problems.  It 
essentially  commits  to  the  continuation  of  monetary  easing  even  after  it  becomes 
unnecessary. Hence, there is an ex post incentive to renege on the promise made. 
                                                   
9  Purchases of equities were explicitly sterilized. That is, they were carried out as strategy (ii). On 
the other hand, those of ABS were a part of QEJ.   
10  Ueda (2012) finds some effect of the equity purchase scheme on the stock market. It 
also studies, and finds significant effects of some of, the easing measures adopted since 
2008.   9 
     Second,  a  more  practical  problem  faced  by  the  BOJ  was  the  following.  The 
strategy did lower interest rates to some extent, but did not succeed in raising prices. 
The absence of quick fruits invited calls for further action from outside. This strategy, 
however, does not easily lend itself to use in an incremental manner. For example, one 
can think of revising “continuation of a zero rate until deflation ends” into “continuation 
of  a  zero  rate  until  inflation  is  one  percent.”  There  is,  however,  an  obvious  limit. 
Moreover, if a stronger commitment was useful, it should have been put to use in the 
first place. Thus, with the use of the strategy the central bank is apt to experience a 
painful period in which the only thing it can do is to prey for an increase in the natural 
rate of interest. 
 
Foreign exchange market intervention and non-traditional monetary policy 
     Normally,  foreign  exchange  market  intervention  (henceforth,  intervention)  is 
more powerful when accompanied by a monetary policy change. This general principle 
has  led  to  enormous  confusion  about  intervention  at  the  ZLB.  Regarding  Japan’s 
intervention, especially since 1999, many argued that it would not affect the exchange 
rate if it was sterilized.   
     A short comment on the institutional aspect of intervention is in order. In Japan’s 
case an intervention to purchase a foreign currency is a decision made by the Ministry 
of Finance (MOF). The MOF finances this operation by a temporary sale of treasury 
bills to the BOJ, which is understood to be undone by a prompt issuance of treasury 
bills  in  the  market.  The  BOJ  normally  "sterilizes"  the  fund  flows  generated  by 
intervention.
11  Otherwise, the overnight interest rate will be affected. This certainly 
implies that if the funds were left un -sterilized, monetary policy is eased and  a larger 
effect on the exchange rate can be expected. 
     At the ZLB, the difference between unsterilized and sterilized intervention is an 
expansion of central bank balance sheet by a purchase of treasury bills, which is QE0. 
To the extent that QE0 is ineffective at the ZLB, the difference between the two types of 
intervention is nil. Needless to say, the difference can be non -negligible if the BOJ 
sterilizes the initial intervention, but embarks on a certain type of QE1 or QE2 that is 
expected to generate some easing effects on the economy.     
     One unexpected outcome of QE0 or QEJ, however, was that the U.S. Treasury 
seems to have given a green light for Japan's intervention to the extent that it was 
                                                   
11  In practice, the BOJ compares the fund generated by intervention along with other supply of 
funds in the system and the level of funds consistent with the target on the overnight rate, and 
decides on the amount of fund supplying/withdrawing operations.   10 
unsterilized.
12  Japan carried out huge amounts of U.S. dollar purchasing interventions 
in the early 2000s, which may have been a factor behind the tendency for the U.S. dollar 
to stay above 100 yen during the period. If this claim that the interventions were made 
possible by QEJ is correct, QEJ or QE0 had the "unintentional" consequence of making 
possible  the  MOF's  intervention,  w hich  is  use  of  strategy  (ii)   by  the  MOF,  and 
moderated the deflationary pressure in the economy. 
 
Financial crisis, other deflationary forces and the BOJ policy 
     The summary of evidence on the effectiveness of non-traditional monetary policy 
measures in the last section indicated that while some of the QE1 type measures were 
effective,  evidence  on  the  effectiveness  of  QE2  type  measures  was  less  clear.  This 
seems to place central banks in a difficult situation if a major financial crisis forces 
them to lower interest rates to near zero levels and adopt non-traditional policies, but 
deflationary concerns remained even after financial stresses dissipated. This is because 
the room for further use of QE1 measures would narrow, while QE2 measures may not 
be very effective.   
     In a sense the BOJ was in such a situation in the mid 2000s. Serious stresses in 
the money market disappeared, but banks were still not lending. CPI inflation became 
positive  only  because  of  rising  commodity  prices,  while  its  ex  food  and  energy 
component stayed in negative territory. As the financial system stabilized, it became 
difficult for the BOJ to find strategy (ii) (QE1) type measures to adopt. QE2 was not 
producing clear-cut effects. 
     Strong deflationary forces remained in the Japanese economy through the mid 
2000s.  Not  only  banks  but  also  non-financial  corporations  were  in  a  serious 
de-leveraging mode. The non-financial corporate sector saw a sharp, unintended rise in 
leverage  in  the  1990s  as  a  result  of  declining  asset  prices.  This  forced  them  to  go 
through a long period of de-leveraging by using savings to repay debt. Additionally, 
fiscal policy has been tight especially since 2000. The declining population also added 
to the weakness in aggregate demand for goods and services. These forces seem to have 
limited the impact of the BOJ's operations on the economy.   
     We might add that although inflation fell into negative territory, it did not show a 
tendency for a deflationary spiral, which is somewhat of a puzzle. It may well be that 
the  BOJ's  non-traditional  policy  measures  have  had  at  least  the  positive  effect  of 
avoiding a destabilizing rise in the rate of deflation.   
 
                                                   
12  See Taylor (2007), pp. 284-87.   11 
Could the BOJ have done more?   
In light of the BOJ's failure to stop deflation, one might argue that the BOJ should 
have done more. Regarding strategy (ii), the BOJ may have taken larger credit or market 
risks. This could have included purchases of bank loans, direct lending by the BOJ or 
taking  properties  as  collateral.  The  BOJ  can  hardly  be  seen,  however,  to  have 
comparative  advantage  in  these  activities.  Also,  some  of  these  operations  are  fiscal 
policy in nature. Either, they should be done by the government or there needs to be an 
accord between the BOJ and the government about the purpose, size, and loss sharing 
rule of the operations if the BOJ’s balance sheet is to be used. Similarly, the BOJ could 
have bought more JGBs. Again, this would have also called for a BOJ-government 
accord on possible loss sharing. In addition, strategy (i) could have been strengthened to, 
for example, "continuation of a zero rate until inflation reached 1%." Or else, some 
version of price level targeting could have been adopted.   
Ten year JGB rates had been, however, in the range of 0.5-2.0% for most of the 
period.  This  was  a  joint  result  of  the  BOJ’s  unconventional  policy  measures  and, 
ironically, their failure to increase inflation and inflation expectations. It is unclear by 
how much, if any, rates would have declined by much larger purchases by the BOJ and 
by how much possible declines in rates would have been stimulated the economy. What 
seems to have been necessary was a rise in inflation expectations or an expectation of a 
sustained pickup in economic activity. Such changes in expectations were unfortunately 
observed only for a brief period right after the introduction of QEJ as we saw in Figure 
3.   
    
Should the BOJ have acted earlier? Implications for the U.S. 
     Raising  actual  and  expected  inflation  does  not  seem  to  be  an  easy  task  once 
deflationary  expectations  become  entrenched.  From  this  perspective  non-traditional 
monetary policy measures by the BOJ may have come slightly too late. Figure 5 shows 
CPI inflation rates after the peak of the bubble in Japan and the U.S with the left end of 
the horizontal axis set to equal the peak of the bubble, the beginning of 1990 for Japan 
and the summer of 2007 for the U.S. As argued above, inflation was already below 1% 
in Japan in the mid 1990s. Adoption of, say, strategy (i) around that time may have had 
a higher chance of success.
  13  In reality, the BOJ adopted strategy (i) in 1999 when 
inflation was already negative. 
     This line of reasoning suggests that the U.S. economy may be at a critical point. 
                                                   
13  In addition, policies to address the bad loan problem of the banking sector, especially the 
recapitalization of banks, should have come much earlier.   12 
Some  non-traditional  measures,  especially  QE1,  have  been  used  and  successfully 
contained financial market stresses. But the risk of further disinflation remains. Figure 5 
shows that U.S. inflation is now close to where Japanese inflation was in the mid 1990s. 
Limitations of the effectiveness of further non-traditional measures cannot be ignored. 
For example, with resumption of stability in financial markets central banks will have to 
shift from QE1 to QE2 type measures whose effectiveness is less certain. The measures 
may succeed in lowering interest rates further. Figure 6, however, shows 5 year swap 
rates for both Japan and the U.S. The rate in the U.S. is already close to where Japan's 
rate was at the beginning of the ZIRP period. The room for further declines in interest 
rates is limited. It is quite uncertain by how much further monetary policy measures will 
stimulate the U.S. economy.   
 
Issues concerning the exit from non-traditional measures 
     On the other hand, a reversal of the disinflationary trend will prompt attempts to 
exit from non-traditional monetary easing policies. Below I offer a few remarks about 
the BOJ' experience in this regard. 
     The BOJ decided to exit from QEJ in March 2006. Figure 7 shows that within 
half a year the current account balances declined by more than two thirds. The figure 
also  shows  that  these  declines  in  the  current  account  balances  were  matched  by 
reductions in the outstanding amount of short-term fund supplying operations. That is to 
say, the BOJ did not roll over short-term fund supplying operations and reduced the 
amount of funds in the system. Thus, the process of reductions in the size of the balance 
sheet was smooth in the BOJ's case as it had large amounts of short-term fund supplying 
operations  at  the  time  of  exit.
14  This may not be the case for other central banks, 
although they can, of course, tighten by raising the interest rate on (excess) reserves. 
     In contrast to the current account balances, reducing the amount of JGB purchases 
or selling the equities purchased was not easy for the BOJ as shown in Figures 8 and 9. 
The BOJ has never sold the JGBs it purchased. In fact, it had continued to buy the same 
amount of JGBs as in the QEJ period even after the exit until it increased the amount of 
purchases in response to the recent worldwide financial crisis. There is some decline in 
the amount of equities the BOJ holds, but most of the decline has come from valuation 
effects.
15  Relationships with the fiscal authority may have mattered for the decision to 
keep the amount of JGB purchases the same even after the exit, while possible market 
                                                   
14  It is also noteworthy that these sharp declines in the current account balances did 
not produce serious negative effects on the economy. This is consistent with weak effects 
of QE0 on the economy. 
15  The BOJ has been buying equities again in response to the recent financial and economic crisis.   13 
impact may have slowed the pace of the BOJ's sale of equities it purchased. Such an 
experience of the BOJ suggests possible difficulties of exit from large scale purchases of 
non-traditional assets. 
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Table 1  Policy Options near the ZLB
Strategy i managing expectations about future levels of the policy rate
intended effect today's medium- and  long-term rates will be affected
Strategy ii targeted asset purchases without 
(may include lending against non-traditional assets) sterilization
intended effect portfolio rebalancing QE2
liquidity premiums in dysfunctional markets will be reduced QE1
Strategy iii Quantitative Easing (purchase TBs to raise excess reserves) QE0








Quantitative Easing (target on the banks' current account balances)
Table 2  The BOJ's Non-traditional Operations during 1999-2006
zero rate until deflationary concerns are dispelled (April 1999-August 2000)
zero rate until CPI inflation becomes stably above zero (March 2001-March 2006)
purchases of equities from banks
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Data source: Bloomberg.   17 
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Figure8 The amount of the BOJ’s Monthly Purchases of JGBs (data source: CEIC) 
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Figure 9 The amount of equities held by the BOJ (data source: CEIC) 